Module: Familia::VerifiableIdentifier
- Extended by:
- SecureIdentifier
- Defined in:
- lib/familia/verifiable_identifier.rb
Overview
Creates and verifies identifiers that contain an embedded HMAC signature, allowing for stateless verification of an identifier's authenticity.
Constant Summary collapse
- RANDOM_HEX_LENGTH =
The length of the random part of the ID in hex characters (256 bits).
64- TAG_HEX_LENGTH =
The length of the HMAC tag in hex characters (64 bits). 64 bits is strong enough to prevent forgery (1 in 18 quintillion chance).
16
Class Method Summary collapse
-
.generate_verifiable_id(base_or_scope = nil, scope: nil, base: 36) ⇒ String
Generates a verifiable, base-36 encoded identifier.
-
.plausible_identifier?(identifier_str, base = 36) ⇒ Boolean
Checks if an identifier is plausible (correct format and length) without performing cryptographic verification.
-
.reset_secret_key! ⇒ nil
Clears the memoized secret so the next VerifiableIdentifier.secret_key call re-reads the environment.
-
.secret_key ⇒ String
The secret key for HMAC generation, loaded from an environment variable.
-
.verified_identifier?(verifiable_id, base_or_scope = nil, scope: nil, base: 36) ⇒ Boolean
Verifies the authenticity of a given identifier using a timing-safe comparison.
Methods included from SecureIdentifier
generate_id, generate_lite_id, generate_trace_id, shorten_to_trace_id, truncate_hex
Class Method Details
.generate_verifiable_id(base_or_scope = nil, scope: nil, base: 36) ⇒ String
Generates a verifiable, base-36 encoded identifier.
The final identifier contains a 256-bit random component and a 64-bit authentication tag.
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# File 'lib/familia/verifiable_identifier.rb', line 117 def self.generate_verifiable_id(base_or_scope = nil, scope: nil, base: 36) # Handle backward compatibility with positional base argument if base_or_scope.is_a?(Integer) base = base_or_scope # scope remains as passed in keyword argument elsif base_or_scope.is_a?(String) || base_or_scope.nil? scope = base_or_scope if scope.nil? # base remains as passed in keyword argument or default end # Re-use generate_id from the SecureIdentifier module. random_hex = generate_id(16) tag_hex = generate_tag(random_hex, scope: scope) combined_hex = random_hex + tag_hex # Re-use the min_length_for_bits helper from the SecureIdentifier module. total_bits = (RANDOM_HEX_LENGTH + TAG_HEX_LENGTH) * 4 target_length = Familia::SecureIdentifier.min_length_for_bits(total_bits, base) combined_hex.to_i(16).to_s(base).rjust(target_length, '0') end |
.plausible_identifier?(identifier_str, base = 36) ⇒ Boolean
Checks if an identifier is plausible (correct format and length) without performing cryptographic verification.
This can be used as a fast pre-flight check to reject obviously malformed identifiers.
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# File 'lib/familia/verifiable_identifier.rb', line 176 def self.plausible_identifier?(identifier_str, base = 36) return false unless identifier_str.is_a?(::String) # 1. Check length total_bits = (RANDOM_HEX_LENGTH + TAG_HEX_LENGTH) * 4 expected_length = Familia::SecureIdentifier.min_length_for_bits(total_bits, base) return false unless identifier_str.length == expected_length # 2. Check character set # The most efficient way to check for invalid characters is to attempt # conversion and rescue the error. Integer(identifier_str, base) true rescue ArgumentError false end |
.reset_secret_key! ⇒ nil
Clears the memoized secret so the next secret_key call re-reads the environment. Intended for test suites that swap the configured secret (or exercise the missing-secret path) within a single process. Production code never needs this: the secret is fixed for a deployment, and rotating it requires a restart (and invalidates every previously generated identifier).
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# File 'lib/familia/verifiable_identifier.rb', line 100 def self.reset_secret_key! @secret_key = nil end |
.secret_key ⇒ String
Security Considerations:
- Secrecy: This key MUST be kept secret and secure, just like a database password or API key. Do not commit it to version control.
- Consistency: All running instances of your application must use the exact same key, otherwise verification will fail across different servers. If both variables are set, they must hold the same value: identifiers are only verifiable with the secret that generated them.
- Rotation: If this key is ever compromised, it must be rotated. Be aware that rotating the key will invalidate all previously generated verifiable identifiers.
- No committed fallback: There is intentionally NO default. A hardcoded secret in source would be public knowledge, letting anyone forge valid identifiers (issue #310, S1). When neither variable holds a nonblank value, this raises -- but lazily, the first time an identifier is actually minted or a plausible one is verified, so merely requiring this file (e.g. for introspection) never blows up. Malformed identifiers are rejected by verified_identifier? before the secret is read. The failure is not memoized: fixing the environment and calling again succeeds.
The secret key for HMAC generation, loaded from an environment variable.
This key is the root of trust for verifying identifier authenticity. It must be a long, random, and cryptographically strong string.
Two environment variables are consulted, in this order:
- +VERIFIABLE_ID_HMAC_SECRET+ -- the legacy name. When nonblank it wins.
- +IDENTIFIER_SECRET+ -- the preferred name going forward. Read only when the legacy variable is unset or blank.
A blank (empty or whitespace-only) +VERIFIABLE_ID_HMAC_SECRET+ does not raise on its own; it falls through to +IDENTIFIER_SECRET+. Container setups that inject +VERIFIABLE_ID_HMAC_SECRET=$VERIFIABLE_ID_HMAC_SECRET:-+ (an empty string whenever the outer variable is unset) therefore keep working when only +IDENTIFIER_SECRET+ is configured. +VERIFIABLE_ID_HMAC_SECRET+ remains fully supported for compatibility and is not deprecated.
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# File 'lib/familia/verifiable_identifier.rb', line 67 def self.secret_key # Treat a present-but-blank value the same as absent. ENV.fetch only fires # its default block when the key is missing, so a blank "" (or a # whitespace-only " ", e.g. from a YAML parser or templating tool) would # otherwise sail through and HMAC every identifier under an effectively # empty key -- silently reintroducing the forgeable-key weakness #310 S1 # closed. nonblank_env fails closed on nil, "", and all-whitespace alike, # which is also what lets a blank legacy variable fall through to # IDENTIFIER_SECRET instead of raising (issue #423). @secret_key ||= begin value = nonblank_env('VERIFIABLE_ID_HMAC_SECRET') || nonblank_env('IDENTIFIER_SECRET') if value.nil? raise KeyError, <<~MSG.strip Neither VERIFIABLE_ID_HMAC_SECRET nor IDENTIFIER_SECRET is set (or both are blank). Familia::VerifiableIdentifier reads VERIFIABLE_ID_HMAC_SECRET first and falls back to IDENTIFIER_SECRET; it refuses to fall back to a committed default or empty secret -- a known or empty key would let anyone forge valid identifiers. Generate one with `openssl rand -hex 32` and export it as IDENTIFIER_SECRET before generating or verifying identifiers. MSG end value end end |
.verified_identifier?(verifiable_id, base_or_scope = nil, scope: nil, base: 36) ⇒ Boolean
Verifies the authenticity of a given identifier using a timing-safe comparison.
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# File 'lib/familia/verifiable_identifier.rb', line 145 def self.verified_identifier?(verifiable_id, base_or_scope = nil, scope: nil, base: 36) # Handle backward compatibility with positional base argument if base_or_scope.is_a?(Integer) base = base_or_scope # scope remains as passed in keyword argument elsif base_or_scope.is_a?(String) || base_or_scope.nil? scope = base_or_scope if scope.nil? # base remains as passed in keyword argument or default end return false unless plausible_identifier?(verifiable_id, base) expected_hex_length = (RANDOM_HEX_LENGTH + TAG_HEX_LENGTH) combined_hex = verifiable_id.to_i(base).to_s(16).rjust(expected_hex_length, '0') random_part = combined_hex[0...RANDOM_HEX_LENGTH] tag_part = combined_hex[RANDOM_HEX_LENGTH..] expected_tag = generate_tag(random_part, scope: scope) OpenSSL.secure_compare(expected_tag, tag_part) end |